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The spectre of carbon border-adjustment
measures
Navraj Singh Ghaleigh* and David Rossatiˆ
I. Introduction: When Sustainable Development Meets Trade, Meets Climate
Law
Imagine that there had been a global financial crisis and that governments around the world had
responded by intervening massively into their economies by way of stimulus packages which
inter alia created “green jobs”. One instance of this imaginary response might have been the
government of Ontario’s Green Energy and Green Economy Act,1 which guaranteed that local
producers supplied a minimum content of the technology to meet the province’s renewable-
energy targets. Were such a provision to take effect, it could be foreseen that a leading trading
partner of Canada, say Japan, might be concerned that it would discriminate against its own
products contrary to Article III.4 of GATT (“like products of national origin”), Article 2.1 of
the Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) Agreement (national treatment rules, “NT”),
and Article 3.1(b) of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement (prohibited
subsidy). As it happens, no imagination is required for any of the above, as it forms the background
to Japan’s recent complaint to the WTO, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable
Energy Generation Sector, Request for Consultations by Japan.2
∗ Edinburgh Law School, <n.ghaleigh@ed.ac.uk>, <www.ssrn.com/author=742422>. This article builds on a
paper given at the conference “Trade and Sustainable Development” held at Sungkyunkwan University on 9 October
2010. I am particularly grateful to the conference organiser and excellent discussant (respectively Professors Jae Ho
Sung and Dae-Won Kim) and those colleagues and graduate students that contributed to the discussion on the day
including Professors Zhang Guihong, Seung Wha Chang, Jee Hyung Lee, and Deok-Young Park. Thanks are also
due to the anonymous referees for their improving remarks and my colleague Dr James Harrison for his comments
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Such disputes can be expected to be ever more common, not merely as the consequences of
stimulus packages shake out, but as nations, predominantly developed nations, adopt even more
ambitious national and regional climate-change regulatory frameworks. To the extent that such
frameworks have an outward face, they will typically impinge on the complex legal relation-
ships between the multilateral trading system and sustainable development. These reflect the
diversity of competing claims between the interests of developing and developed economies,
environmental integrity and material welfare, and the commercial values inherent in trade lib-
eralization and non-commercial values embedded in environmental standards. Such claims play
out in various forms, one being the common desire of developing nations to exploit the export
opportunities available to them, an ambition facilitated by the aims and objectives of unimpeded
trading. Importing developed states invariably set domestic environmental policies, and the goal
of ensuring their effectiveness may drive importing states to require imported goods to comply
with those same environmental standards. To do otherwise, so the argument goes, would under-
mine the domestic policy. The rejoinder is that conditioning market access on environmental
grounds may deprive the developing economy of an export opportunity by stripping it of its
international competitive advantage. Such are the basic arguments.
This paper focuses on a single subset of these arguments, namely those pertaining to the inter-
national legal regimes of climate change and the WTO. Even with this narrowing of the field,
the range of legal relationships between the two are extensive. Consider the Kyoto Protocol’s
Clean Development Mechanism. By promoting international investment abroad, it necessarily
interacts with international investment rules, and especially with TRIMs. The literature already
acknowledges the possibility of such complexities, and their diversity. International climate
change law and national policies consisting of so-called trade-related environmental measures
(TREMs) can potentially clash with obligations of various WTO Agreements. National technical
and environmental requirements on imported products can violate both GATT and the agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Incentive schemes to promote renewables might
raise doubts as to their compatibility with SCM. Moreover, measures affecting the two different
levels of the carbon markets—spot and derivative—can have an effect on the services provided
in that context, with the result of raising complaints under the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS).3
Given the range of potential interactions, this article addresses only a restricted number of issues
drawn from both the familiar jurisprudence of the WTO and less-well-surveyed initiatives taken
in the United States and European Union. The commonality of approach and use of similar policy
tools—carbon border-adjustment measures4 are discussed—is of utility to trade lawyers seeking
3 For a thorough treatment of such issues, see Thomas Cottier, Olga Nartova and Sadeq Z. Bigdeli, eds., Interna-
tional Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change (2009).
4 Defined as “any fiscal measures which put into effect, in whole or in part, the destination principle (i.e. which
enable exported products to be relieved of some or all of the tax charged in the exporting country in respect of similar
domestic products sold to consumers on the home market and which enable imported products sold to consumers
to be charged with some or all of the tax charged in the importing country in respect of similar domestic products)”.
See Working Party Report, GATT Working Party on BTAs, L/3463, 2 December 1970.
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to divine future conflict zones at the trade/climate nexus. That analysis is prefaced by discussions
in Part II of the various meanings ascribed to the concept of sustainable development and its status
in international law, followed by its place in the climate change regime. Part III starts with some
basics of the trade/environment relationship before examining the general-exceptions clause of
GATT XX and its elaboration in the relevant WTO disputes. Part IV considers this body of
law in the context of the problem of “carbon leakage”—the phenomenon of mitigation policies
in one territory leading to the displacement and growth of emissions in another—as concern
grows within those polities undertaking or considering comprehensive climate-change policies
and measures. Two particular polities, the United States and European Union, are examined, and
the compatibility of their responses with WTO law is considered.
II. The Concept of Sustainable Development in the Climate Change Regime
There is something of motherhood-and-apple-pie about the concept of sustainable development.
Who could take against the idea of promoting social and economic development for the world’s
poorest whilst safeguarding the environment? As French notes, it “is one of those concepts that
it is difficult to disagree with”.5 Be that as it may, defining the parameters of the concept is not
entirely elementary, whether in general international law or in the regime under present scrutiny,
the international climate-change regime.
1. Sustainable Development—Meanings and Status
The animating assumption of sustainable development is not, upon reflection, particularly con-
troversial. It goes beyond the somewhat unhelpful idea that the environment and development
are “linked”, towards the stronger claim that “the issues themselves are inseparable in terms of
the causes, their dynamism and, ultimately, their resolution”.6 In the particular case of climate
change, such a proposition can scarcely be contested. As far as causes are concerned, we know
that the economic and industrial development in the modern era, say post-1750, has been driven
by the exploitation of natural resources, initially in Great Britain, spreading to western Europe
and then North America, and in recent decades to south and east Asia in particular. As fossil
fuels have been extracted and combusted, applied to other resources such as iron ore, timber,
and extracted minerals, the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has increased.
Put by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change at 280 parts per million in 1750, the
increase of atmospheric CO2 concentrations to 379 ppm by 2005 is substantially a function of
global industrialization.7 That the rate of increase of GHG concentration has been highest in
recent decades, when the traditional developed economies have been joined in the processes of
industrialization by new entrants from the global South, indicates that the energizing force of
development—its dynamism—has operated in much the same direction as that of environmental
5 Duncan French, Sustainable Development, in, Research Handbook on International Environmental Law, 51 at
51 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice, David M. Ong and Panos Merkouris, eds., 2010).
6 Ibid., at 52. Emphasis added.
7 See Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle, and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (3rd ed.,
2009), 335, at 336.
66 N.S. Ghaleigh and D. Rossati / The spectre of carbon border-adjustment measures
degradation. As to resolution, it is not the case that development will necessarily lead to environ-
mental degradation. Indeed, the new modes of development that are entailed by the transition to a
low-carbon society—better-insulated buildings, energy efficiency measures, greater reliance of
renewable-energy generation, mechanisms to avoid deforestation and forest degradation, and so
on—have the potential to benefit all economies (whatever position they occupy on the continuum
of development) and citizens (freeing them from both the adverse effects of climate change and
resource scarcity). As McGoldrick notes: “The critical importance of sustainable development
is that it is an integrationist principle ... The relative weighting of economic, environmental and
human rights norms has become increasingly complex”.8
As to its presence in treaty law, sustainable development looms large in both the international
climate regime and a broad range of other binding and non-binding texts. As regards the latter, the
following all make mention of the notion of sustainable development: the 1994 Desertification
Treaty, 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biodiversity, 2000 Constitutive
Act of the African Union, 2003 UN Convention Against Corruption, and 2003 Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control. This is a significant number and range of treaty instruments, to
which could be added other bilateral and regional treaties, non-binding resolutions, “soft law”
declarations, and indeed the case law of the ICJ.9 For the purposes of the trade regime, the 1994
Uruguay Round agreements added a number of substantive environmental provisions, including
environmental clauses into the WTO Agreement, the GATS, and the SPS, SCM, TRIPS, and
Agriculture Agreements.10 Most importantly for present purposes, the preamble to the WTO
Agreement itself recognizes the “objective of sustainable development.”
The cumulative legal impact of these sources at the very least makes it arguable that sustainable
development has become part of general international law. What, though, are the implications
of this? The case can strongly be made that it introduces an interpretive obligation on tribunals
to consider the requirements of sustainable development. As noted by the Appellate Body of
the WTO in Shrimp-Turtle I (1998) when relying on the preambular reference to sustainable
development, the concept “reflects the intentions of negotiators of the WTO Agreement ... we
believe it must add colour, texture and shading to our interpretation of the agreements”.11
2. Sustainable Development in the Climate Change Regime
For the purposes of the climate regime itself, the matter is simultaneously both more straight-
forward and more complex. The straightforwardness comes from the fact that sustainable
development finds repeated and prominent mention throughout both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto
8 Cited by French, supra note 5, at 55.
9 Case Concerning the Gabcˇ´ikovo-Nagymaros Project, 25 Sept. 1997, ICJ Reps., 7, at para. 141 [hereinafter
“Gabcˇ´ikovo-Nagymaros”].
10 For the history of the inclusion of the notion of sustainable development in these agreements, see Steve
Charnovitz, The WTO’s Environmental Progress, 10 JIEL 691 (2007).
11 United States – Import Prohibition of Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report WT/DS58/R, 6
November 1998, para. 153 [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle].
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Protocol. It has been noted that Article 2 (“Objective”) of the UNFCCC makes reference to sus-
tainability in the context of economic growth, and as such subordinates it to little more than “an
adjunct to economic growth”.12 Indeed, the same could be said of the preamble, which seems to
make an even weaker commitment to sustainable development by way of the recognition “that
all countries, especially developing countries, need access to resources required to achieve sus-
tainable social and economic development”.13 Similar support for the concept can be garnered
from the text of the Kyoto Protocol, although with similar qualifications as to its legal content,
status, and implications. Protocol references to sustainability are found in Articles 2.1, 2.1.a.iii,
2.1.a.iv, 3.4, 10, and 12. Above all, Article 12 defines the purposes of the CDM as being, “to
assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing
to the ultimate objective of the Convention”.
A stronger formulation is found in Article 3.4 (“Principles”):
The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development. Policies and measures
to protect the climate system against human-induced change should be appropriate for the specific
conditions of each Party and should be integrated with national development programmes, taking
into account that economic development is essential for adopting measures to address climate
change.
If we are to follow the argument that the legal consequences of sustainable development are
reliant upon the elaboration of legal principles, these can certainly be found in the above pro-
vision. French argues that the principles of integration, sustainable use, equity, and the duty
to co-operate, together “provide the basic framework for sustainable development ... the legal
minimum”.14 Although space precludes a full discussion, Article 3.4 of the UNFCCC explicitly
makes provision for the notion of integrated environmental considerations being taken in eco-
nomic planning, drawing thereby on Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration of 1992. Similarly, the
final clause of Article 3.4 is a very strong nod in the direction of a notion of fairness or equity
among nations, by taking into account their varied stages of development, and indeed “specific
conditions”. This is not the precise form of (intergenerational) equity envisaged by Principle
3 of the Rio Declaration, although such considerations are present in the preambular text of
the UNFCCC as well as Article 3.1. In any event, the search for an autonomous legal meaning
of sustainable development in the UNFCCC and KP is likely to be in vain. Instead one might
consider it in the context of the approaches taken by other international regimes and customary
law—in our case WTO law. Under this wider perspective it is possible to grasp the conceptual
controversy around sustainable development itself, reflected also by the International Court of
Justice.15
12 French, supra note 5, at 57.
13 See also Art. 4(2)(a).
14 French, supra note 5, at 58.
15 Gabcˇ´ikovo-Nagymaros, supra note 9, at para. 140, in which the Court refers to sustainable development as a
“concept” rather than a principle.
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III. The Meeting of Trade and Climate Change, By Way of Shrimp-Turtle
1. Basics of Trade and Environment
From a sustainable development perspective, the multilateral trading regime presents a challenge.
A nation that implements strict domestic environmental regulations to promote sustainable devel-
opment may find a tension between them and elementary rules of WTO law. Such a nation may,
as mentioned earlier, take the view that unimpeded imports from a trading partner that does not
have similarly robust environmental regulations will render its own regulatory regime nugatory.
Accordingly, it may adopt trade measures that would restrict market access to such goods on the
basis that they are unsustainable, but such an approach might very well be precluded by the WTO
agreements on the basis of the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) principle (GATT I), the principle
of national treatment (GATT III), or GATT IX, which prohibits quantitative restrictions. Such
trade/environmental dilemmas are far from unknown.16 Indeed, the foundational agreement of
the WTO, the Marrakesh Agreement (1994), recognizes in its preamble that increased production
should allow
for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable devel-
opment, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing
so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic
development.
This precipitated the WTO undertaking a pathway to institutional and conceptual development
that has culminated in recent decisions under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)
related to the environment. In 1994 WTO Members constituted a Committee on Trade and
Environment (CTE) with the aim of identifying the relationship between the two areas and
making recommendations to the Ministerial Conferences.17 More detailed terms of reference
for the CTE were agreed in 2001 during the start of the Doha round, when the policy concept
of “mutual supportiveness” between environment and trade in international negotiations was
developed.18 Whilst the stalemate in negotiations under the Doha round has not led to substantial
results, the WTO Secretariat has nonetheless engaged in liaison activities with administrative
bodies of other treaties and in further studies on the issue.19 From the first, then, as well as
since, the WTO recognized both the possibility of a clash between trade and environmental
concerns, and that untrammelled trade could damage the environment. These are to be balanced
16 The legal trade/environment scholarly literature is substantial. For a good synoptic treatment, see Daniel
Bodansky and Jessica C Lawrence, Trade and Environment, in The Oxford Handbook of International Trade
Law, 505-538 (Daniel Bethlehem, Donald McRae, Rodney Neufeld and Isabelle Van Damme, eds., 2009) and the
references therein. A particularly good monographic analysis is found in Erich Vranes, Trade and the Environment:
Fundamental Issues in International Law, WTO Law and Legal Theory (2009).
17 Trade and Environment, GATT 1947 Ministerial Decision, 14 April 1994, reprinted in (1994) 33 ILM 1267.
18 Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001, paragraphs 6 and 31. The declaration high-
lighted three issues on which the CTE should base its activity, namely the relationship between WTO provisions
and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), the institutional relationships between the WTO and MEAs
secretariats, and the reduction or elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers for environmental goods and services.
19 Note however the criticisms of Charnovitz, supra note 10.
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against the standard argument that free trade itself has a sustainability dimension, favouring those
economies that produce a given good most efficiently—for example, that it is more sustainable,
not just cheaper for everyone, for oranges to be grown in sunny Spain or Israel and traded
with Scotland than production to be housed in energy-intensive Scottish greenhouses, even
taking shipping into account. Similarly with environmentally sound technologies (EST). Trade
liberalization would encourage the dissemination and deployment of EST more fully than a
world in which high tariffs were in place for solar PV, wind turbines, and the component parts
of the carbon-capture-and-storage technology chain.
The nub of the matter, however, is the permissibility of TREMs from the perspective of WTO
law. Can economies that apply high domestic environmental standards (typically Western ones)
restrict market access to goods from other economies with lower environmental standards (typ-
ically those in the global South)? Again, this is not an issue that been gone unconsidered by the
UNFCCC, which states that:
The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that
would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly devel-
oping country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change.
Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means
of arbitrary or unjustiﬁable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.20
This provision can be seen as an endorsement of the orthodoxy of trade liberalization—that an
“open international economic system” is the best means of economic development—and that,
allied with an attentiveness to sustainability, it can better enable parties to the agreement to
deal with climate change. The final sentence is salutary, warning against trade measures that
intentionally or otherwise operate as restrictions on international trade.
2. GATT XX and General Exceptions: from Shrimps to Tyres
Any such trade measures will most likely necessitate consideration of Article XX of GATT and its
twin provision in Article XIV of GATS.21 Deriving as it does from the 1947 text, it is not surprising
that it makes no specific reference to the environment. Indeed, its title is “General Exceptions”,
which is precisely what it provides for—a series of exceptions to measures which would ordi-
narily be prohibited under GATT rules. These include, but are not restricted to, measures which
are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”,22 or measures “relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption”.23 These two exceptions are com-
20 Article 3.5, emphasis added.
21 One general exception under the GATT Article XX(g) is not replicated in the GATS. See also Robert Howse
and Antonia L. Eliason, Domestic and International Strategies to Address Climate Change: an Overview of the
WTO Legal Issues, in Cottier, Nartova and Bigdeli, eds., supra note 3, at 61.
22 Article XX (b) GATT.
23 Article XX (g) GATT.
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monly understood to allow the adoption of TREMs under the GATT. A trade restriction based on
environmental grounds can follow under paragraph (b) or (g). Given the different wording of the
two provisions, different tests apply—developed in the WTO’s jurisprudence—pertaining to the
compatibility of measures with the Article. As discussed below, this has consequences for the
design of border-tax adjustments (BTAs) adopted on climate-change grounds. However, before
a DSU panel, parties may not adopt such measures under GATT XX without justification. As the
chapeau states, any such general exceptions are “subject to the requirement that such measures
are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable dis-
crimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade”.24 As noted in the introduction, whilst climate-related measures can poten-
tially impinge on obligations under the TBT, its application in the case of BTAs is somewhat
marginal, given that an import tax is unlikely to amount to a technical standard or requirement
of production.
Accordingly, the general exception as articulated in GATT XX would appear to permit parties to
adopt trade-restrictive measures that are necessary for the protection of the environment, or that
are related to the protection of the environment. Such measures ought nonetheless to comply
with basic principles of the WTO, such as non-discrimination, and will require a party to adopt
domestic environmental measures if it wishes to prohibit the importation of “environmentally
unfriendly” products, so as to avoid the prospect of closing the borders to foreign polluting
goods whilst domestically produced goods continue to have such qualities. Without delving
into the entirety of the jurisprudential evolution on the interpretation of the article,25 the key
operationalization of the Article XX exception can be seen in the Appellate Body’s reasoning
in the Shrimp-Turtle and Brazil-Tyres disputes. Shrimp-Turtle was amongst the earlier disputes
adjudicated upon under the then new WTO dispute-resolution arrangements, and following the
disappointing GATT panel decisions in the Tuna-Dolphin dispute,26 it presented the opportunity
for the new institutional arrangements to display both their effectiveness and a newfound sensi-
tivity for environmental considerations under GATT XX. The central issue at stake—whether a
nation may impose unilateral measures which in effect apply their own environmental standards
extraterritorially and thereby prohibit the import non-complying goods—has clear parallels with
national climate-standard provisions, which will be discussed in the section below.
The facts of the case are sufficiently well known not to require repetition here, but the Appellate
Body’s three-step test is of importance. Firstly, in order for a measure to come under GATT
XX, one must determine whether the policy pursued falls within the range of policies and
motives enumerated in Article XX(a)-(j). In Shrimp-Turtle, the Appellate Body took a rather
generous approach as to whether the US measure concerned the conservation of “exhaustible
24 Article XX GATT, chapeau.
25 See for instance, Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, et al., Environment and Trade: A Guide to WTO Jurispru-
dence 76-147 (2006).
26 US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna-Dolphin), Panel Report DS21/R – 39S/155, 3 September 1991 and
US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna-Dolphin II), Panel Report DS29/R, 16 June 1994. Neither report was
adopted.
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natural resources” within the meaning of Article XX(g).27 Giving the term an “evolutionary”
meaning,28 noting the preambular reference to sustainable development, and seeking guidance
from various modern international conventions which make references to natural resources as
including both living and non-living resources, the Appellate Body concluded that sea-turtles
constituted exhaustible natural resources pursuant to Article XX(g). Although the resource did
not fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the United States, the Appellate Body held that there
was a “sufficient nexus” between the United States and sea-turtles, an attenuation that may have
significance for future climate-related disputes. A similar test was deployed in US-Gasoline, in
which “clean air” was held to be a resource for the purposes of Article XX(g).29 The second
limb of the test required that the measure at issue must be either “necessary” for, or “relating
to”, the pursuit of the specific policy. The Appellate Body observed that “the means and ends
relationship between Section 609 of the [Endangered Species Act 1989] and the legitimate policy
of conserving an exhaustible, and, in fact, endangered species, is observably a close and real
one”.30 The third and final limb of the test requires that the measure be applied in conformity with
the chapeau of Article XX, which is intended to prevent the abuse of the “limited and conditional”
exceptions under which a measure might be preliminarily justified under the subparagraphs.31
The chapeau operates as a balancing principle, mediating between the rights of a member to
invoke an exception and its obligation to respect the rights of other members. It was here that the
United States came unstuck, as the decision of the Appellate Body agreed (although on much
narrower grounds) with the panel that the application of the US measure was “arbitrary and
unjustifiable”.32
For the purposes of the climate change/trade relationship, there are two points of importance to
take away from the Shrimp-Turtle dispute. Firstly, unilateral measures to protect the environment
are not per se inconsistent with the GATT. The conditioning of access to domestic markets on the
basis of other members’ compliance with, or adoption of, a policy unilaterally prescribed by the
importing country is capable of justification under Article XX GATT. In contradistinction with
the early Tuna-Dolphin dispute, unilateral measures to protect the environment beyond national
jurisdictions are now accepted as permissible, subject to qualifications. Foremost amongst these
is that unilateral measures are justified only if they are tailored (as those of the United States were
not) to meet due-process concerns, take into account the conditions in other member states, and
the importing member has sought in good faith a multilateral solution before resorting to unilat-
eral action. Secondly, the Appellate Body’s consideration of relevant multilateral environmental
agreements (MEAs) in order to ascertain the meaning of the term “exhaustible natural resources”
27 Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 11, para. 126.
28 Ibid., para. 130.
29 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Appellate Body Report (1996)
WT/DS2/AB/R, 26 April 1996.
30 Ibid., para. 141.
31 Ibid., para. 157.
32 However, the amended US measure was found to be compatible with Article XX in the Article 21.5 proceedings
brought by Malaysia – see United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate
Body Report WT/DS58/AB/RW, 22 October 2001.
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confirmed the relevance of other international agreements for the interpretation of WTO law,
thereby setting an important precedent for WTO dispute-resolution panels to acknowledge the
mutually beneficial relationship between the WTO legal framework and MEAs. The matter is
not definitively resolved, and debate continues on the exact circumstances in which WTO adju-
dication bodies are under an obligation to take into account other rules of international law,
with the subsequent case law taking both expansive and relatively restricted approaches to the
interpretation of WTO law in the light of other rules of international law.33
Another unsolved issue which does not stem from, but is related to Shrimp-Turtle and the “mutual
supportiveness” goal between trade and environment within the WTO, concerns the choice for
proper jurisdiction in international law for conflicts between the two areas. In other words, to what
extent can a WTO panel be deemed the competent body to adjudicate an MEA/WTO conflict,
and why could such dispute not be dealt with under MEA dispute-resolution procedures? On
this issue, Boyle suggests that there would be “little difficulty” for a Panel to follow an extensive
interpretation of the categories in Article XX so as to encompass every measure taken pursuant
to an MEA.34 As is argued below, this may well occur in the future. However that view still does
not take into account the issue that, as Pauwelyn notes, a panel has several implied jurisdictional
powers, including the one of deciding “whether one should refrain from exercising substantive
jurisdiction that has been validly established”.35
Shrimp-Turtle is a milestone in the WTO’s environmental jurisprudence. However, the general
exception applied in the case relates only to Article XX’s paragraph (g). The Appellate Body
could not there provide an interpretation of the other exception related to the environment, Article
XX (b), exempting measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”. Note
in the first instance the concept of necessity under paragraph (b), in contrast to the “relating to”
requirement of paragraph (g). Both the WTO case law and attendant literature have weighed
in heavily on the concept of necessity without clearing up all the ambiguities contained in it.
Without providing a complete analysis of the jurisprudence on this issue,36 a sense of Article XX
(b) can be gleaned by reference to the latest pertinent Appellate Body decision: Brazil-Tyres.37
This dispute involved a claim made by the European Community against a Brazilian import
ban on retreaded tyres. Underpinning this policy was the claim that the accumulation of waste
tyres in landfill sites would result in an increased risk of harm to the environment and human
33 See generally Joost Pauwelyn, Conflicts of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other
Rules of International Law (2003), Margaret Young, The WTO’s Use of Relevant Rules of International Law: An
Analysis of the Biotech Case 56 ICLQ 907 (2007) and Benn McGrady, Fragmentation of International Law or
Systemic Integration of Treaty Regimes 42 J World Trade 589 (2008).
34 Alan Boyle, The Relationship Between International Environmental Law and Other Branches of International
Law, in The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, 125, at 138 (Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brune´e
and Ellen Hey, eds., 2008).
35 Pauwelyn, supra note 33, at 448.
36 See Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al., supra note 26, 156-184; and Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of
the World Trade Organization, 621-651 (2 ed., 2008).
37 Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports Of Retreaded Tyres, Appellate Body Rep., WT/DS332/AB/R, 3 December
2007 [hereinafter “Brazil-Tyres”].
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health. The case is noteworthy for two reasons: firstly, the Appellate Body further clarified the
interpretation of necessity in the GATT’s exception, recognizing that, being different from the
expression in paragraph (g), “necessary” could not mean “indispensable”, but rather that the
policy, while trade-restrictive, meaningfully contributed to the achievement of its own aims.38
Furthermore, the Appellate Body specified that the “meaningfulness” of a measure could be
assessed either qualitatively or quantitatively, as long as it makes a material contribution to its
stated purpose. In other words, a Panel will not necessarily have to rely on a scientific/statistical
assessment of how the adopted measure has, during a certain time-span, achieved its aim. It could
also rely on deductive reasoning to gauge how, according to the measure’s relevant features, it
could potentially and meaningfully contribute to its aim. It is also noteworthy that on this specific
issue the Appellate Body refers to climate change as an analogous case:
the results obtained from certain actions—for instance, measures adopted in order to attenuate
global warming and climate change, or certain preventive actions to reduce the incidence of diseases
that may manifest themselves only after a certain period of time—can only be evaluated with the
benefit of time.39
The Appellate Body seems to be hinting at a possible future application of a BTA’s necessity
test, recognizing as it does the eligibility of a qualitative approach to measuring whether a BTA
can potentially contribute to the aim of making foreign products as “climate friendly” as like
domestic ones. This does not mean, however, that satisfying such a test will be an easy task. That
would depend on the specifics of the BTA.
The second clarification regards the interpretation of the chapeau of Article XX, concerning
the second step that a measure needs to satisfy. The measure must not be “applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination”. The Appellate
Body rejected the finding of the Panel, stating that discrimination is unjustifiable when it does
not bear any relationship with the “legitimate objective” of the measure.40 On this point Davies
notes that the Appellate Body incurred the risk of blurring the boundary between the primary test
(“necessity” under paragraph (b)) and the chapeau requirements, given the fact that both consider
the rationale of the adopted measure.41 Although it can be argued that the two assessments were
different, as they tested the measure in two different contexts,42 this may not be sufficient to
avoid such an interpretative impasse because it is not guaranteed that future disputes will involve
external laws or cases that could affect the way a measure is applied. By making Article XX’s
“two-tier” approach a single one—in the case of Article XX(b)—Brazil-Tyres seems to make
it easier to allow a measure under Article XX of GATT, and it is likely that this interpretation
38 Ibid., at paragraph 210.
39 Ibid., at paragraph 151.
40 Ibid., at paragraph 228.
41 Arwel Davies, Interpreting the GATT Article XX in Light of the “New” Approach in Brazil-Tyres, 43 Journal
of World Trade Law 507-540, at 522 (2009).
42 Ibid., at 530-1. While the “necessity” test consisted of an impact analysis of the import ban alone, the chapeau
test was related to an exception adopted by Brazil after a Mercosur case found that the import ban was infringing
Mercosur obligations.
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could be extended to other WTO Agreements that rely on that provision. However, it remains
somewhat unpredictable how a future Panel would address the question. Further guidance may
be offered following the recent Panel request brought by Canada against the European Union
for its import ban on seal products.43
IV. National Climate Change Regulatory Frameworks and Their Impact on
Trade Rules
Moving on from WTO law and its environmental jurisprudence, we turn now to how that body of
law is implicated by the climate-change policies of two of the leading global actors, the European
Union and the United States. Whilst both have, famously, taken very different domestic paths to
addressing climate change44—with the European Union commonly characterized as a leader45
and the United States as a laggard—there remain some notable similarities in approach.46 These
shared approaches are not found in the internal aspects of the various approaches to climate-
change mitigation, such as carbon markets, but rather in their external dimensions, in particular
the approach to carbon leakage. It should be noted that much of what follows, in so far as
it pertains to the United States, is somewhat speculative, in the sense that the United States,
at the time of writing, has yet to adopt a comprehensive domestic climate-change framework.
Nonetheless, the attempts to date, and in particular the abortive Waxman-Markey Bill, give a
strong sense of what any future US regime may look like.
1. The Problem of Carbon Leakage
The problem of carbon leakage is one well known to international and national climate policy.
In the context of the CDM, in which it is well developed, it captures the idea of an increase in
emissions outside the project boundary that occurs as a consequence of the project activity’s
implementation. That understanding has been formalized in a COP decision as follows:
Leakage is defined as the net change of anthropogenic emissions by sources of greenhouse gases
which occurs outside the project boundary, and which is measurable and attributable to the CDM
project activity.47
43 WTO dispute DS400 started on 2 November 2009.
44 Navraj Singh Ghaleigh, Anti-Americanism and the Environment in, Anti-Americanism, 139-162 (Brendon
O’Connor, ed., 2007).
45 Navraj Singh Ghaleigh, Emissions Trading Before the ECJ: Market Making in Luxembourg, in Legal Aspects
of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and Beyond, 367-390 (David Freestone and Charlotte Streck, eds., 2009).
46 See generally, Kathryn Harrison and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, Global Commons, Domestic Decisions: The
Comparative Politics of Climate Change (2010).
47 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 51.
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The CDM Executive Board has elaborated upon that definition in the following terms:
In an operational context, the terms “measurable” and “attributable” in paragraph 51 of the CDM
modalities and procedures should be read as “which can be measured” and “directly attributable”,
respectively.48
Where leakage does occur, the CDM rules require that equivalent emissions must be deducted
from the emission reductions generated by the relevant project activity, and that Certified Emis-
sion Reductions (CERs) are issued only in respect of the net reduction in emissions brought
about by the project, once leakage had been taken into account.49 From the perspective of those
economies, such as the European Union, that have imposed significant emission-reduction obli-
gations on their industrial sectors, carbon leakage poses a variety of risks. As discussed in
subsection 3 of this Part below, consideration of leakage, in the contexts of both competitiveness
and environmental integrity, has animated and substantially driven the European Union’s own
policies. The impact of similar concerns has arguably been even greater in US debates on domes-
tic climate change action. The Waxman-Markey Bill, discussed in the following subsection, made
repeated reference to the concept50 and provided for “leakage prevention activities”,51 measures
to encourage the avoidance of leakage,52 and standards to monitor and account for leakage.53
Consider the following “factional” scenario. The European Union imposes on all its member
states an obligation to reduce their industrial greenhouse-gas emissions by 20 per cent within
a decade or so. For a member like Poland, this is particularly demanding, as it has very few
energy resources and alternatives other than coal combustion. Moreover, given the long-running
impacts of the emergence from the post-Soviet era, Poland lacks the industrial and economic
infrastructure to re-engineer its economy in the necessary fashion. The relatively low Polish GDP
and standard of living for many of its citizens makes this task even harder. Even if a transition
to a low-carbon economy were possible for Poland, and such a path were chosen, the short-to-
medium-term impacts would be considerable in terms of traditional (dirty) industries and would
be likely to have significant consequences for unemployment, as the costs of the transition—new
plant, further mechanisms, new processes, etc.—began to bite. Consider further the very real
possibility that the new cost-profile of, say, Polish steel manufacturing, makes the steel of its
neighbour Ukraine (not an EU member state and, as such, unregulated) highly attractive to the
international market. Steel that was formerly manufactured in Poland is now manufactured in
the Ukraine, at a lower cost and higher emissions. This state of affairs would result in higher
aggregate emissions, and as such represent an environmental disbenefit. Moreover, it would
48 EB 5, Annex 3, paragraph 10(d).
49
“Leakage” in the context of afforestation/reforestation has a differing, but similar, definition – 5/CMP.1, Annex,
paragraph 1(e).
50 Defined in section 762 of that bill, infra note 56 as “any substantial increase in greenhouse gas emissions by
industrial entities located in other countries if such increase is caused by an incremental cost of production increase
in the United States resulting from the implementation of this [provision].”
51 Ibid, section 751.
52 Ibid, section 754(d)(6)(C).
53 Ibid, section 754(d).
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entail a loss of jobs in territories such as Poland which operate under a demanding climate-
change regime. This in turn would undermine domestic support for the climate-change regime,
and, in the case of the European Union, undermine support for the entire political structure,
which, as is well known, is rather shaky in Poland.
Accordingly, carbon leakage is a considerable problem for those polities that adopt demand-
ing emission-reduction targets. Admittedly, the problem will not rear its head in all industrial
sectors—some, such as electricity, are reasonably immune from leakage, as electricity is not
highly transportable beyond relatively short distances. Rather, leakage is a risk in certain indus-
trial subsectors, most notably cement, ferrous metals, nitrogen fertilisers, and pulp and paper.
2. Carbon Border-Adjustment Tariffs—US Proposals
The border-adjustment measure for exposed sectors is emerging as the preferred policy-tool to
address carbon leakage (in conjunction with conditional free allocation of emission allowances,
state aid, and government-led sectoral agreements). Carbon BTAs require the payment of a
border tax, or the surrender of emission allowances equivalent to the tax, by importers of goods
produced under less demanding climate-related constraints than those in force domestically. The
rationales for BTAs are numerous and cumulative: to incentivize other countries to adopt more
demanding climate policies; to incentivize producers in countries not subject to carbon pricing
to reduce their emissions; to reassure domestic audiences regarding the competitiveness of their
own industries; to avoid leakage or the relocation of carbon-intensive industries; and to avoid
free allocation and facilitate auctioning.
These are not simply thought-experiments. In the United States carbon border-adjustment mea-
sures have found form in a number of legislative proposals of which the Waxman-Markey Bill
(the American Clean Energy and Security Bill 2009) is only the most recent. None of the bills
considered below have gained the approval of the US Senate, and nor are they likely to as long
as the Berlin Mandate remains in place. Nonetheless, the character of measures considered by
the federal legislature is noteworthy, if only for their family resemblance to those undertaken
by the European Union. In 2007 the Bingaman-Specter Climate Change Bill (the Low Carbon
Economy Act 2007)54 introduced an “international reserve allowance requirement”, the purpose
of which was to “ensure that greenhouse gas emissions occurring outside the United States do
not undermine the objectives of the United States to address global climate change [and] to
encourage effective international action to achieve those objectives.”55 To this end, from 2019
the President would determine whether major trading partners were undertaking “comparable
action”. If not, he would require that a compensating quantity of allowances be purchased from
54 S.1766, 110th Congress, 2007-8. See generally <http://energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=
IssueItems.View&IssueItem ID=e6a0eeb8-4fda-437c-8ce3-f8b77d28d32e> visited on 2 March 2011. The Bill also
provided for national GHG emission reduction targets, a cap and trade scheme and incentives for CCS and technol-
ogy development. Bingaman was, and at the time of writing still is, the Chairman of the US Senate’s Committee
on Energy and Natural Resources.
55 Section 502.
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a special international reserve allowance pool, for all greenhouse-gas-intensive “primary prod-
ucts” imported from an offending country. All proceeds from the sale of international reserve
allowances would be deposited into a special fund for expenditure on international technology
development.56 This approach was broadly followed in the following year’s Lieberman-Warner
Bill (Climate Security Bill 2008),57 which proposed a requirement for the purchase of “interna-
tional reserve allowances” to cover goods imported from countries that had not taken adequate
mitigation steps.58
As is well known, both these Bush-era bills met with very little success. Whilst the Waxman-
Markey Bill at least reached the Committee stage of the Congressional legislative process, none
of its predecessors did. This makes the Waxman-Markey Bill the most successful of the climate
change proposals yet moved, approved as it was by the US House of Representatives.59 The
bill is commonly regarded as more comprehensive and ambitious than its predecessors. Whilst
this is reflected in its wide-ranging provisions on clean energy,60 energy efficiency,61 global
warming reduction,62 transitioning to a “clean energy economy”,63 and forestry and agricultural
offsets,64 the same is true for its provisions on BTAs. Located in Title IV, subpart 2 (“Promoting
international reductions in industrial emissions”), the “international reserve allowance program”
of section 768 bore the imprints of both an iterative legislative process and greater and more
serious engagement with international climate change policy.
In term of the coverage of goods, Waxman-Markey, as introduced, spoke in the same terms as
the earlier bills, namely of “primary products”.65 By the time the bill was passed by the House, a
different term, “covered good”, was used. Defined in section 762, this is a good that “corresponds
to an eligible industrial sector” or is a “manufactured item for consumption”. This would appear to
be a more nuanced definition than “primary products”, relying as it does on categories contained
in the North American Industrial Classification System of 2002 and including finished goods
(although the challenges that these would raise for the purposes of determining the country
56 Ibid.
57 S.2191, 110th Congress, 2007-8.
58 Section 6006. For an analysis of the Lieberman-Warner Bill’s consistency with WTO law, see Paul-Erik Veel,
Carbon Tariffs and the WTO: An Evaluation of Feasible Policies, 12(3) J. of Int’l Econ. L. 749-800 (2009).
59 H.R.2454, 111 th Congress, 2009-10.
60 Title I proposed, inter alia, a 20 per cent federal renewable energy target by 2020, smart grid development and
mandatory CCS by 2025.
61 Title II proposed, inter alia, a series of energy efficiency standards for buildings, lighting, appliances and heavy
vehicles.
62 Title III and VII proposed, inter alia, a national cap and trade scheme with 17 per cent emission reduction targets
by 2020 and 83 per cent by 2050 (both against a 2000 baseline year, not the Kyoto Protocol’s 1990).
63 Title IV proposed, inter alia, a series of funding mechanisms to offset the costs of the Bill to low income earners,
offset energy price rises and retrain displaced workers.
64 Title V proposed, inter alia, domestic agricultural and forestry offset programs.
65 Defined in Lieberman-Warner, section 6001 as “iron, steel, aluminum, cement, bulk paper or glass” or other
manufactured products with comparable emissions.
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of origin of complex finished goods would presumably be great). As regards the countries to
which BTAs might be relevant, the earlier bills made reference to countries that had not taken
“comparable action” or were exempt by virtue of low levels of development of emissions. Again,
the version of Waxman-Markey as presented to the Senate included a slightly different test from
earlier bills, with the notion of “comparable action” being replaced by the need for compliance
with a set of standards, namely:
(1) [that a] country is party to an international agreement to which the United States is a party that
includes nationally enforceable and economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions reduction commit-
ments ... at least as stringent as that of the United States; (2) the country is party to a bilateral or
multilateral emission reduction agreement for that sector ... (3) the country has an annual energy
or greenhouse gas intensity ... for that sector that is equal or less than the United States.66
Given the death of the bill, and especially following the midterm elections of 2010, there is no
immediate prospect of the operationalization of such measures in the United States. Moreover,
when considering Waxman-Markey, it should be borne in mind that its BTA provisions would
not have been automatically invoked, but rather implemented only with Presidential authority;
and they were deliberately drafted broadly, to give the executive very considerable discretion
in their operationalization. In political terms, they were supported, somewhat predictably, by
labour interests, which wanted them to have effect automatically as from 2012. Most Democratic
senators, however, opposed the measures in principle, consistent with what has been termed an
Obama presidency “fundamental shift in the principled ideas of the congressional leadership.”67
Given that approach, the measures can be read as substantially symbolic, inserted to appease
labour interests. Such gestures, demonstrating a heightened sensitivity to electoral incentives, are
far from unknown in US climate politics, which has consistently shown deference to organized
interests of varying political stripes.68
3. Carbon Border-Tax Adjustments—EU Scheme
As with its broader approach to GHG emissions, the European Union’s regime pertaining to BTA
is considerably more detailed, and legally settled, than that of the United States. The focal point
of the European Union’s “integrated approach” to climate and energy policy was completed in
June 2009, when four complementary legislative instruments were concluded in the form of the
“climate and energy package”. The revised EU ETS69 is at the heart of the package,70 and is
66 Section 767.
67 Kathryn Harrison, The United States As Outlier: Economic and Institutional Challenges to US Climate Policy,
in Harrison and Sundstrom, supra note 46, 67 at 95.
68 Ibid.
69 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme
for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC
amended by: Directive 2004/101/EC of 27 October 2004 L 338 18 13.11.2004, Directive 2008/101/EC of 19
November 2008 L 8 3 13.1.2009, Regulation (EC) No 219/2009 of 11 March 2009 L 87 109 31.3.2009, Directive
2009/29/EC of 23 April 2009 L 140 63 5.6.200 [hereinafter “EU ETS”, “the Directive” or “the Scheme”].
70 Council Directive 2009/29/EC, Amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Improve and Extend the Green-
house Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme of the Community, available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
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supplemented by an “effort-sharing scheme” which aims to reduce GHG emissions from sectors
not covered by the EU ETS71 through binding national targets for renewable energy72 and a
legal framework to promote the development of CCS.73 These instruments provide the legal
pathway for the EU member states to collectively reduce the European Union’s greenhouse gas
emissions by at least 20 per cent by 2020 (against a 1990 baseline), to ensure that at least 20
per cent of the European Union’s energy consumption is met from renewable sources, and to
reduce primary energy use by 20 per cent (compared with projected levels) by energy-efficiency
measures. The package is of course intimately linked with the UNFCCC, but equally importantly
for our purposes, the WTO. The long-standing position of the European Union has been that the
best method to address leakage is a comprehensive climate-change agreement under the auspices
of the UNFCCC, but in the absence of such an agreement (which the Copenhagen COP failed
to achieve and which its Cancun successor took only the first tentative steps towards realizing),
“appropriate measures” may be taken to address leakage.
The European Union has invested considerable political energy in constructing a legal regime for
addressing climate change. Its climate and energy package is described by the World Bank as “the
most concrete of [the] national, regional and international actions on climate change”.74 Whilst
it is an open question whether the complex and comprehensive arrangements of the European
Union have had the desired effect in terms of strengthening the European Union’s hand in
international climate-change negotiations, there can be no doubt that the edifice’s foundation,
the EU ETS,75 is a regulatory instrument of global dimensions, and within the sphere of the
global carbon market it is very much its largest single element. The EU ETS’s share of the global
carbon market in 2008 was approximately $92 billion, from a total transacted value of $126
billion. The second largest element of the market is the secondary market for CERs, whose 2008
transactions amounted to $26 billion. As one of us has noted elsewhere:
The EU ETS’s trading volumes dwarf those of its rivals—the voluntary Chicago Climate Exchange,
the New South Wales ETS, the New Zealand ETS and the fledgling Japanese scheme—none of
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0063:0087:en:PDF>. For a comprehensive analysis of the package,
on which this subsection draws, see Elisa Morgera, Kati Kulovesi, and Miquel Mun˜oz, Environmental Integration
and the Multifaceted International Dimensions of EU Law: Unpacking the EU’s 2009 Climate and Energy Pack-
age, University of Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper No. 2010/38 (forthcoming in Common Market Law
Review).
71 Council Decision 406/2009/EC, The Effort of Member States to Reduce Their Greenhouse Gas Emissions to
Meet the Community’s Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Commitments up to 2020, available at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0136:0148:EN:PDF>.
72 Council Directive 2009/28/EC, Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources and Amend-
ing and Subsequently Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0016:0062:EN:PDF>.
73 Council Directive 2009/31/EC, The Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide and Amending Council Directive
85/337/EEC, European Parliament and Council Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC,
2008/1/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006, available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0114:0135:EN:PDF>.
74 State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2009 1 World Bank (2009).
75 See also the summary at Jan H Jans and Hans HB Vedder, European Environmental Law 385-388 (2008).
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which has a volume equal to even 1% of the EU ETS. The Scheme’s position of primacy will
remain unchallenged unless and until a federal US scheme is established.76
For all its detailed provisions and dominance of the global carbon market, the fact remains that
this regime poses a risk to the international competitiveness of the European Union. The European
Union is alone amongst the major emitters to subject its industrial sectors to the strictures of
mitigation efforts up to and well beyond the Kyoto standard. As noted by Morgera et al. (supra
note 70) the European Union has been well aware of such competitiveness considerations, and
a significant function of the climate and energy package has been to minimize carbon leakage.
In a pre-legislative statement issued in 2008, the European Commission stated that:
In the event that other developed countries and other major emitters of greenhouse gases do
not participate in an international agreement that will achieve the objective of limiting global
temperature increase to 2◦C, certain energy-intensive sectors and sub-sectors in the Community
subject to international competition could be exposed to the risk of carbon leakage. This could
undermine the environmental integrity and benefit of actions by the Community.77
The Commission has subsequently listed sectors that it determined to be vulnerable to leakage,78
with these sectors to be protected from leakage by a free grant of the entirety of their allowances.
Further, as an alternative, the possibility of a “carbon equalisation system” (as described above)
was discussed.79 These proposals, as well as the post-Copenhagen review mechanism, are con-
tained in Article 25 of Directive 2009/29/EC, which is the Directive that amended the original
ETS Directive80 “so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading
scheme of the Community”. The Article is extracted below:
The Commission should therefore review the situation by 30 June 2010 ... the Commission should
identify which energy-intensive industry sectors or subsectors are likely to be subject to carbon
leakage [and] base its analysis on the assessment of the inability of industries to pass on the cost
of required allowances in product prices without significant loss of market share to installations
outside the Community which do not take comparable action to reduce their emissions. Energy
intensive industries which are determined to be exposed to a signiﬁcant risk of carbon leakage
could receive a higher amount of free allocation or an effective carbon equalisation system could
be introduced with a view to putting installations from the Community which are at significant
risk of carbon leakage and those from third countries on a comparable footing. Such a system
could apply requirements to importers that would be no less favourable than those applicable to
76 Supra note 45. The analysis of the Community Courts’ case law relating to the EU ETS therein is built on and
extended in the present section.
77 COM(2008) 16, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive
2008/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system of the Community,
cited in Morgera et al., supra note 70.
78 Commission Decision of 24 December 2009 determining, pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council, a list of sectors and subsectors which are deemed to be exposed to a significant risk
of carbon leakage, OJ L 1, 5.1.2010, 10–18, cited in Morgera et al., supra note 70.
79 See further the discussion in Morgera et al., supra note 70, at footnote 120 and attendant text.
80 2003/87/EC.
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installations within the Community, for example by requiring the surrender of allowances. Any
action taken would need to be in conformity with the principles of the UNFCCC, in particular
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, taking into
account the particular situation of least developed countries (LDCs). It would also need to be in
conformity with the international obligations of the Community, including the obligations under
the WTO agreement.81
After the unsatisfactory outcome of the Copenhagen COP, and in accordance with the review
procedure contained in Article 25, the Commission published its review in May 2010.82 Here the
Commission outlined the three broad tools available to it to address carbon leakage: support to
energy-intensive industries through continued free allowances; adding to the costs of imports to
compensate for the advantage of avoiding low-carbon policies; or taking measures to bring the
rest of the world closer to EU levels of effort.83 The first of these was viewed as “the most obvious
way to provide further help to level the playing field”, although including imports into the ETS is
also noted with approval.84 The broader issue of trade policy and an open trading system is also
considered. Pace certain critics,85 the Commission expressly made allowance for the fact that
“developed and developing country mitigation efforts will not run at the same pace”,86 although
whether the emerging policy will fully satisfy the requirements of the principle of common but
differentiated responsibility will not be known before the full policy details are published.
The Commission also addressed the complications of creating a WTO-compliant BTA regime,
with the suggestion that a scheme limited to a number of standardized commodities, such as steel
or cement, would operate best, with each category of goods having a defined average EU carbon
content, although the administrative burden would “be a difficult and protracted process”. Thus
the Commission was of the opinion that, in the short term, the measures in the package addressing
leakage were justified, further noting that the US proposal—at the time still alive—was to operate
along similar lines, as discussed above.87
4. Conclusion: An Argument That is Merely the Tip of the Iceberg
A very good case can be made to the effect that the sort of response to carbon leakage envisaged
by the European Union manages to pick its way among the by-ways of WTO law such as to
achieve compliance. Although the following argument focuses almost entirely on GATT XX
81 Emphases added.
82 COM(2010) 265 final. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, Council, the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Analysis of options tomove beyond 20%greenhouse
gas emission reductions and assessing the risk of carbon leakage, 26.5.2010, cited in Morgera et al., supra note 70.
83 Ibid., at 11.
84 Ibid.
85 Biswajit Dhar and Kasturi Das, The EU’s Proposed Carbon Equalization System: Can It Be WTO Compliant,
25 November 2009, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1513231 at 51.
86 Supra note 78, at 12.
87 Ibid., at 12.
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issues, it is also the case that a BTA on imported products, whose production does not face
similar national emission limitations, could also be GATT-compliant. Article II.2(a) states that:
Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from imposing at any time on the
importation of any product: (a) a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with the
provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III in respect of the like domestic product or in respect of an
article from which the imported product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part.
Again, this provision constitutes an exception to the obligations on the schedules of the conces-
sion system under Article II of GATT and, again, it contains many interpretative challenges to
test the compatibility of a BTA on imports. Such a measure would have to apply to “like prod-
ucts” or to an “article” used during the manufacturing of the product.88 On the meaning of “like
products”, WTO law has an extensive jurisprudence and literature. Suffice to note that the differ-
ent way that a product is manufactured in two states (Process and Production Methods—PPM)
can lead to the products being deemed “different”, and as such excluding the application of
Article II.2(a). However, this relationship between “likeness” of products and PPMs is further
complicated by the distinction between product- and non-product-related PPMs. In the case of
the latter, the final product does not physically incorporate the results of a PPM. A requirement
that reduces GHG emissions in the manufacture of a certain good would lead to a non-product-
related PPM. In the case of a dispute based on a BTA, the fact that the two compared products
appear physically similar, would make it harder to consider them “unlike”, and thus there would
be more ground for Article II.2(a) to apply. In turn, in the hypothetical case of import mea-
sures based on a PPM affecting some physical component of the final product, such a difference
between products could amount to an “unlikeness” between the two, resulting in the impossi-
bility of applying Article II.2(a). Such a distinction therefore reflects what the Appellate Body
noted in EU-Asbestos: that the likeness of products entails a competitive relationship in the
market.89
A second issue pertains to Article III(2):
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.
Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to
imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.
While the first sentence specifies that a BTA on imports may not be more onerous than the
internal measure (in this case, ETS-quantified limitations) and is to apply only in the case of
88 See Javier De Cendra, Can Emissions Trading Schemes be Coupled with Border Tax Adjustments? An Analysis
vis-a`-vis WTO Law, 15(2) RECIEL 131-145, at 141 (2006).
89 EC-Asbestos, AB Rep. WT/DS135/AB/R, 12 March 2001, para. 98.
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like products, the second phrase requires in addition that such a BTA shall not favour domestic
production, where imported products are “directly competitive or substitutable”.90
From such obligations and exceptions it is, however, possible to unravel a set of stages to gauge
the compatibility of a carbon BTA on imports with the GATT. Does the measure violate either
MFN/NT principles or the exception of Article II.2(a)? If yes, then Article XX (b) or (g) may
provide the basis to exempt the measure and thus make it compatible with the WTO. Although
apparently straightforward, the complexity of the jurisprudence on the many issues involved
makes the task very uncertain. However, it is likely that the EU regime would not fall foul of the
requirement that taxes and charges on imports should not be applied “in excess” to taxes levied on
like domestic products or on input articles, drawing on the distinction of PPMs. As far as GATT
XX compliance is concerned, it is possible to fashion an argument that the three-stage test of
Shrimp-Turtle—as further detailed in Brazil-Tyres—can accommodate a measure as envisaged
above by the European Union.
The “inclusion” requirement is not completely straightforward, but either paragraph (g)91 or
paragraph (b)92 could be expected to satisfy the threshold question. Certainly the latter would
require fewer legal gymnastics, but the adoption of an “evolutionary” interpretation combined
with reference to the relevant international conventions—the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, but
also the CBD and others—would suggest that measures taken could be justified as falling under
one or both headings. Less demanding may be the second limb, namely whether the measure
is either necessary for, or relating to, the pursuit of the policy of emission-reductions. Given
the portfolio of measures that the European Union is adopting and the risk that carbon leakage
poses to them, the task of establishing a means-and-ends relationship between the BTA and the
legitimate policy of emission-reductions ought to be observably close and real. The application
of the measure in compliance with the Article XX chapeau is perhaps the most demanding
element of the test for present purposes, but again, a reasonable argument can be made. The
unilateral nature of the measure is, as we know, not fatal to its status. Rather, the issue at hand is
whether the actual application of the measure is arbitrary and unjustifiable. Clearly the proposed
EU scheme does not require exporting economies to adopt an emission-reduction scheme that is
“essentially the same” as that of the European Union, as was the case in Shrimp-Turtle. Far from
it, there are a range of positions they can take, ranging from instituting comparable emission-
reduction measures domestically to compliance with a carbon-equalization scheme, as well as
points in-between.
In conclusion, the legal compatibility of the BTA with WTO law is at the very least arguable.
Space precludes a complete discussion of the issues,93 but the argument here has sought to address
90 This definition is contained in the Interpretative Note ad Article III Paragraph 2 of the GATT. See Tracey Epps
and Andrew Green, Reconciling Trade and Climate: How the WTO Can Help Address Climate Change, at 92 (2010).
91
“Exhaustible natural resources”, as in Shrimp-Turtle.
92
“Measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”, as in Brazil-Tyres.
93 For a good, general introduction to the broader debates and a comprehensive literature review, see Symposium
on Trade and Climate Changes – Special Issue (T. Brewer, ed.), 33(6) The World Economy, 2010.
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key questions as to legal classification and the availability of the Article XX exemptions. Even
assuming that such exemptions are available, the issue remains as to the policy wisdom of BTAs.
Are these policies likely to encourage the engagement of non-Annex I parties and persuade
their industries to adopt emission-reduction methods, even on a differentiated basis? That will
very much remain an open question, with much depending on the timing of the adoption of
such policies. Moreover, if the adoption of BTAs were to generate a spate of complaints against
the European Union under the DSU, its persuasive, encouraging, qualities would appear to be
somewhat limited. The use of the BTA has been described as law operating as a “regulatory
default penalty”.94 Such penalties, or legal arrangements, are applicable only in the case of
failure to conform to new governance demands—higher emission-reduction regimes, in this
case. The default position is set for the purpose of inducing parties to contract out of it. As
such, argue de Burca and Scott, “Penalty defaults are presented as ‘action-forcing’,” and there
are “numerous examples in the sphere of US environmental governance”, such as the clean-air
example, “whereby the threat of federal intervention serves to mobilise states in their elaboration
of clean air implementation plans”. This regulatory approach can be seen as a pluralist departure
(an unwelcome one) from the European Union’s traditionally constitutionalist approach to the
international legal order.95
94 Grainne de Burca and Joanne Scott, New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism, in Law and New Approaches
to Governance in the EU and US, 1-14 (Grainne de Burca and Joanne Scott, eds., 2006).
95 For an extended discussion of that debate see Grainne de Burca, The European Court of Justice and the
International Legal Order After Kadi, 51 Harvard Journal of International Law, 1 (Winter, 2010).
